Europe wants to regain control of its borders. It is accelerating asylum procedures, multiplying return mechanisms, strengthening Frontex’s powers and calling on African countries to control migration routes. Behind this strategy, a profound transformation of European migration policy is taking shape: it is no longer simply a matter of controlling entries into Union territory, but also of shifting part of the management of migration, reception and responsibilities to states located outside its borders.
This development raises a fundamental question: how far can Europe outsource its migration policy without, in the same movement, outsourcing its legal obligations and human responsibilities?
The question deserves particular attention given that the new European orientations come in a context of tightening asylum law, the multiplication of return mechanisms and the expansion of the powers of the European agency Frontex.
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The European Pact on Migration and Asylum, whose main provisions entered into application on 12 June 2026, constitutes a major step in this transformation. It strengthens the harmonisation of procedures, develops screening mechanisms and accelerates the processing of certain applications for international protection.
But behind this legal harmonisation, a political choice is also taking shape: to make procedures faster, facilitate removals and limit the possibilities of settlement for persons who do not meet the conditions for residence.
The right to asylum faced with the logic of “safe countries”
The use of the notion of “safe country” is not a novelty in European migration policy. It has long been part of the instruments used by states to organise and accelerate the processing of asylum applications.
As early as 1992, even before the existence of a common European asylum policy, European states had begun to develop the notions of “host third countries”, “safe countries of origin” and manifestly unfounded protection claims.
These mechanisms were progressively integrated into national legislation, and then into European law, notably with the “Procedures” directive of 2013.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of 14 May 2024, which replaces this directive, reorganised the European framework for asylum procedures. It distinguishes several categories of countries and situations likely to have consequences on the processing of an application for international protection.
These include in particular:
- safe countries of origin (SCO);
- safe third countries (STC);
- first countries of asylum;
- countries for which the average annual rate of granting international protection in the European Union is less than or equal to 20%.
These categories are not interchangeable. They respond to different legal mechanisms, but all contribute to an evolution towards more selective and, in certain situations, accelerated processing of asylum applications.
The European list of safe countries of origin: Maroc and Tunisie directly concerned
An important change took place on 24 February 2026 with the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2026/464, which establishes a first common list of safe countries of origin at European Union level.
This list comprises seven countries:
- Bangladesh;
- Colombia;
- Egypt;
- India;
- Kosovo;
- Maroc;
- Tunisie.
Added to this list, according to the mechanism provided for by this same regulation, are the nine candidate countries for accession to the European Union:
- Albania;
- Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- Georgia;
- Moldova;
- Montenegro;
- North Macedonia;
- Serbia;
- Turkey;
- Ukraine.
It should however be noted that this qualification of candidate countries is not absolute. The regulation provides for exceptions, notably in the presence of armed conflict, serious threats to civilian populations, certain European restrictive measures, or when the rate of decisions granting international protection exceeds the threshold of 20%.
The classification of a country as a safe country of origin allows in particular the use of an accelerated procedure for examining applications submitted by its nationals. It does not however mean that all such applications must be automatically rejected.
This distinction is essential.
A country may be considered generally safe without each of its nationals personally benefiting from effective protection. A political opponent, a threatened journalist, a human rights activist or a person belonging to a minority exposed to persecution may be in danger in a country nevertheless inscribed on a European list of safe countries.
The cases of Maroc and Tunisie deserve, in this regard, particular attention.
These two countries are both important partners of the European Union in migration management and states whose nationals may seek international protection in Europe.
This situation calls for questioning the coherence of European policy: how can migration partnerships be reconciled with the requirement of an impartial and individualised examination of asylum applications?
The qualification of safe country must not become an instrument for minimising individual situations of persecution or vulnerability.
Safe third countries: another way of shifting responsibility
Another important development concerns the notion of “safe third country”, governed by Regulation (EU) 2026/463 of 24 February 2026.
Unlike the concept of safe country of origin, which concerns the general situation in the country of which the applicant holds nationality, the concept of safe third country refers to another territory to which a person could be transferred.
Under certain conditions, an asylum application may be declared inadmissible when it is considered that the person can benefit from effective protection in a third country.
The new mechanism notably relaxes the conditions relating to the link between the applicant and that country. Transit may thus constitute an element allowing the application of the mechanism, in addition to the other conditions provided for by the regulation.
This development raises considerable questions for African countries.
Can a transit state be led to receive persons who have never durably resided there, simply because they passed through its territory on their way to Europe?
Who will be responsible for their protection? Who will finance their accommodation, their legal support and their access to essential services? What guarantees will prevent their subsequent return to a country where they risk persecution?
The risk is of progressively transforming certain transit countries into spaces for the outsourced processing of asylum applications, even though the political decisions and the rules of this organisation are primarily defined in Europe. A person does not lose their right to international protection because they have crossed a third country.
Frontex: a European agency with growing powers
The reform proposed by the European Commission on 27 October 2026 constitutes a new step in the strengthening of the Union’s migration policy.
Brussels wishes to bring Frontex’s capacity to 30,000 agents, create a rapid reaction force and considerably strengthen the agency’s role in organising returns.
The proposal notably provides for the creation of a return coordination centre and the development of operational capacities allowing Frontex to assist third countries in organising return operations between two states that are not members of the European Union, subject to agreements with the countries concerned and respect for fundamental rights.
In concrete terms, the agency could thus provide technical and operational support to return operations organised from one African country to another country of origin.
This development considerably expands the geography of European intervention. Migration management would no longer be limited to the Union’s borders: it could henceforth intervene in relations between third states.
The Commission presents this reform as a means of improving the efficiency of returns, better responding to crisis situations and strengthening cooperation with partner states.
But the expansion of operational competences raises an essential question: what mechanisms will allow control over operations conducted outside European territory?
Who will be responsible when an operation organised with Frontex’s support results in a violation of fundamental rights? What remedies will be accessible to the persons concerned? How can the transparency of interventions and the identification of responsibilities be guaranteed?
These questions are all the more important given that Amnesty International has already expressed its concerns regarding certain activities of Frontex in the Mediterranean, notably the risk of indirect participation in interceptions that may expose migrants and refugees to violations of their rights.
The expansion of the agency’s competences must therefore be accompanied by independent mechanisms for oversight, investigation and accountability.
Without these guarantees, Europe risks developing an external intervention capacity without sufficiently strengthening the means to prevent abuses and remedy their consequences. It must however be stressed that there is an essential legal distinction: the reform of 27 October 2026 is still a legislative proposal from the European Commission. It must follow the European legislative procedure and obtain the approval of the European Parliament and the Council. The new competences envisaged cannot therefore be presented as powers already definitively granted to Frontex.
Return centres: Africa as Europe’s new strategic depth
On 1 October 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted new common rules concerning the return of third-country nationals who have no right of residence in the Union.
This mechanism notably opens the possibility of creating return centres in countries located outside the European Union, on the basis of agreements with the states concerned.
These centres, often referred to as “return hubs”, are intended to organise the removal of persons who have been subject to a return decision.
This development marks a new step in the outsourcing of European migration policy.
The objective is to make return decisions more easily enforceable, including when the persons concerned are in third countries. It is however important to emphasise that this legal possibility does not constitute an obligation imposed on African countries. No state can be considered automatically required to host a return centre solely by virtue of its geographical position or its relations with the European Union.
The establishment of these mechanisms requires specific agreements, the consent of partner states and guarantees concerning fundamental rights, reception conditions and the allocation of responsibilities.
For African countries, the challenge is therefore to negotiate any such agreements in accordance with their sovereignty, their national capacities and their development priorities.
An African country that agrees to host a return centre is not simply taking on an administrative commitment. It is potentially assuming considerable human, social, financial and security responsibilities.
It is notably necessary to determine accommodation conditions, guarantees of individual liberty, access to healthcare, legal assistance, possibilities for appeal and the modalities of readmission to countries of origin.
Respect for the principle of non-refoulement must remain an absolute requirement. No transfer can be legitimate when it exposes a person to persecution or treatment prohibited under international law.
Europe cannot therefore regard return centres as mere technical infrastructures intended to resolve, at a distance, the difficulties of its own removal procedures.
Africa: partner or buffer zone?
It is probably on the African continent that this new orientation will produce the most significant debates.
Maroc, Tunisie, Mauritania and Egypt occupy a strategic place in migration relations between Europe and Africa. These states are called upon to control migration routes, combat smuggling networks, facilitate readmissions and participate in return mechanisms.
This cooperation mobilises significant European funding. It can contribute to strengthening administrative capacities, improving protection mechanisms and developing reintegration programmes.
But it can also create an unbalanced relationship: Europe defines the security priorities, while African countries bear a growing share of the human, social and political consequences of international mobility.
There is nevertheless a fundamental difference between cooperating on migration management and becoming an operational extension of the European border system.
African states have their own interests, their own constraints and their own migration policies. They must be able to determine the conditions under which they accept cooperation, without funding, trade agreements or visa policies becoming instruments of disproportionate pressure.
For Maroc, this question is of particular importance.
Its geographical position, its relations with the European Union and its African anchorage give it a strategic role in regional migration dynamics.
But its cooperation with Europe must be part of a long-term national vision. It cannot be reduced to the surveillance of European borders from a distance.
Maroc must also take into account its own commitments regarding the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the requirements linked to its African policy.
A transit country cannot be reduced to the role of border guard for another continent.
Africa must not become the buffer zone of a Europe that wishes to distance itself from the human consequences of its own migration choices.
Return is not a development policy
Another confusion deserves to be cleared up: the one that consists in equating administrative return with economic and social reintegration.
Expelling a person does not mean resolving the difficulties that led them to leave.
Return can constitute a possibility when it is voluntary, dignified and accompanied by real prospects. But when it occurs without employment, without support and without resources, it risks reproducing the conditions that initially prompted departure.
The effectiveness of a migration policy cannot therefore be measured solely by the number of expulsions carried out.
It must also be assessed on the basis of the situation of persons after their return: access to employment, training, housing, social support and the possibility of rebuilding a professional path.
This requires sustainable reintegration programmes, built with local communities, businesses, associations and public institutions.
It is also necessary to avoid having the funding devoted to migration primarily directed towards surveillance equipment, control mechanisms and removal operations.
Investment in education, vocational training, healthcare, employment and territorial development must occupy a central place.
Without this dimension, return policies risk becoming mechanisms for the geographical displacement of precarity rather than instruments of stabilisation.
Poland and the question of the limits of the right to asylum
The tightening of European migration policy does not only concern relations with African countries. It also reflects internal tensions within the European Union over the scope of the right to asylum and the prerogatives of member states.
The position defended by Donald Tusk’s Polish government, which had announced in October 2024 its intention to temporarily and territorially suspend certain possibilities of seeking asylum in response to what it presented as an instrumentalisation of migration by Russia and Belarus, illustrates these tensions.
Warsaw invokes national security considerations and the need to respond to the pressures exerted on its eastern border.
This situation nevertheless raises a question of principle: how far can a state invoke national security to restrict access to protection guaranteed by international conventions and European law?
Border security is a legitimate responsibility of states. But it cannot justify a general suppression of the fundamental guarantees attached to the right to asylum.
The fight against the instrumentalisation of migration must remain compatible with respect for the rights of persons who are genuinely seeking protection.
It is therefore important to distinguish the geopolitical strategies of third states from the individual situations of persons who present themselves at European borders.
Confusing the two would amount to making asylum seekers bear the consequences of political conflicts in which they are not necessarily actors.
A European contradiction to overcome
Europe is also confronted with an economic and demographic contradiction.
On the one hand, several sectors of its economy need workers, skills and international mobility. On the other, the possibilities of legal migration remain difficult to access for a significant proportion of candidates, notably African ones.
This contradiction fuels tensions and sustains dangerous migration journeys.
The point is not to claim that opening up legal pathways would make irregular migration disappear. It is to recognise that a migration policy organised exclusively around surveillance, deterrence and return cannot meet all the economic and human needs of both continents.
Professional mobility schemes, training programmes, university exchanges, researcher mobility programmes and recruitment opportunities must form an integral part of Euro-African cooperation.
Border control and the organisation of legal mobility pathways are not necessarily contradictory. They constitute two dimensions of a comprehensive migration policy.
Europe cannot, on the one hand, acknowledge the needs of its labour market and, on the other, neglect the aspirations of an African youth in search of professional prospects and mobility.
Towards a genuine Euro-African migration pact
It is time to move beyond a cooperation dominated by security urgency and negotiations on returns.
Europe and Africa need a genuinely balanced migration partnership, based on reciprocal commitments and a fair distribution of responsibilities.
Five priorities should guide this new approach.
First, guarantee respect for the right to asylum. No return or transfer policy should circumvent the individual examination of protection applications, the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an effective remedy.
Second, preserve the sovereignty of African states. Any agreement relating to reception, transfer or readmission must be based on the consent of the states concerned, precisely defined responsibilities and financial means proportionate to the burdens assumed.
Third, strengthen democratic oversight of Frontex. The extension of its competences must be accompanied by independent mechanisms for oversight, transparency and accountability, particularly for operations conducted outside the European Union.
Fourth, redirect funding towards human development. Resources devoted to migration must support employment, training, public services, social support and reintegration, and must not be limited to surveillance equipment and border control.
Fifth, develop legal mobility pathways. Europe and Africa must build sustainable mechanisms for professional, academic, scientific and entrepreneurial mobility, adapted to the needs of both continents.
The African Union and regional organisations must also participate fully in the definition, negotiation and evaluation of these policies.
A balanced partnership cannot be limited to bilateral negotiations between Brussels and African capitals. It must recognise the place of African institutions in the continental governance of migration.
Human dignity does not stop at borders
The migration question cannot be reduced to a debate about the number of entries, expulsions or kilometres of monitored borders.
Behind every administrative decision, there is a person, a story and sometimes a situation of persecution, vulnerability or economic distress.
The real challenge for Europe is not only to make its borders harder to cross. It is to build a system that clearly distinguishes between situations, respects fundamental rights and assumes the consequences of its decisions.
For Africa, the challenge is equally important: to participate in international cooperation without renouncing its sovereignty, its development priorities and its responsibility towards persons present on its territory.
The future of Euro-African relations cannot be built on a simple delegation of migration constraints. It requires a balanced political dialogue, reciprocal commitments and genuine solidarity between the two continents. A border can be moved, an expulsion can be organised and a return centre can be built far from Europe. But none of these measures makes the causes of migration disappear, nor the obligations to protect persons.
Europe cannot ask Africa to bear alone the human, political and social weight of a policy whose rules it defines.
Border control must not become a pretext for the outsourcing of responsibilities. Migration cooperation must be a shared responsibility, and not a European sovereignty exercised by proxy on African territory.
The true measure of success of a migration policy will not be the number of persons removed from European borders, but the capacity of both continents to protect people, organise legal mobility and build prospects for dignified lives.
Documentary references
- Gisti, Safe countries for asylum seekers, Point sur n° 8, October 2026.
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of 14 May 2024, on the common procedure for international protection.
- Regulation (EU) 2026/464 of 24 February 2026, on the European list of safe countries of origin.
- Regulation (EU) 2026/463 of 24 February 2026, on the concept of safe third country.
- Council of the European Union, 1 October 2026, new rules on the return of irregularly staying third-country nationals.
- European Commission, 27 October 2026, proposal for reform of the Frontex regulation.
- Amnesty International, reaction of 27 October 2026 to the proposed Frontex reform and risks to fundamental rights.
Yahya Yahyaoui
A lawyer, analyst and journalist based in Brussels, he deciphers the economic, legal and regulatory stakes of Europe-Africa relations for Les Afriques: European funding, trade rules and the negotiating capacity of African economies.
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