By 2035, Senegal will need to have profoundly transformed its way of thinking about its economic relations with the Maghreb. The challenge will no longer be simply to develop trade with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Libya, but to build partnerships capable of strengthening industrialization, local processing, exports and Senegal’s integration into African and Euro-Mediterranean value chains.
This ambition is now embedded in the official orientation of Senegalese diplomacy. In April 2026, the President of the Republic asked the Government to systematically anchor a genuine economic diplomacy in the implementation of Sénégal 2050, around three axes: strengthening Senegal’s attractiveness, mobilizing bilateral and multilateral financing, and developing strategic partnerships.
Morocco naturally constitutes the main point of support for this reflection. In 2025, trade between the two countries reached 307 million dollars, while Moroccan investments approved in Senegal between 2010 and 2025 represent 36 projects, for 180.4 billion FCFA and 1,856 jobs. Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko himself estimated that these flows remained below the potential of both economies and called for a shift from trade to co-production, local processing and value chain integration.

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The question for 2035 is therefore less about the volume of exchanges than about their economic quality.
Can Senegal use its access to the West African market, its agricultural, fishery, mining and energy resources and its geographical position to attract more Maghreb industrial investments? Can it, in return, support its businesses toward the Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian and Libyan markets?
From bilateral relations to a Maghreb–West Africa strategy
The partnership with Morocco already offers a possible model. Seventeen agreements and memorandums were signed during the Senegalese mission of January 2026 in fields as varied as industry, mining, agriculture, digital, logistics and training. The Senegalese Government subsequently asked the relevant ministries to present a detailed action plan for their implementation.
The next step should be to measure results: investments actually made, jobs created, local content, skills transfers, export volumes and number of joint ventures.
This logic could then be extended to the other Maghreb economies.
The real challenge of 2035 would thus be to build a space of economic complementarities between the Maghreb and West Africa.
Senegal could play a platform role in this. The Maghreb would contribute notably industrial, financial, technological and logistical capacities; Senegal would offer access to West African markets, resources and an Atlantic positioning.
Five sectors could structure this strategy
- Agro-industry, first, with the objective of processing more of Senegal’s agricultural and fishery output.
- Fertilizers and chemistry, next, by linking Senegal’s phosphate and agricultural resources with the industrial expertise developed in Morocco.
- The pharmaceutical industry and health, where Maghreb expertise can meet Senegal’s objective of strengthening local production.
- Energy and infrastructure, particularly around gas, electricity, logistics and industrial services.
- Digital and high-value-added services, finally, with the possibility of building partnerships between Senegalese and Maghreb technological ecosystems.
2035: making Senegal an economic bridge
The ambition could be to gradually shift Dakar from a role as a market and investment destination toward that of a platform for production, services and exports toward West Africa.
The Dakhla-Dakar corridor mentioned during the January 2026 visit illustrates this new economic geography. The Moroccan government has also associated this perspective with structuring regional infrastructure.
This evolution does, however, impose a condition: Senegal will need to develop its own industrial champions and strengthen its national private sector. The Government itself acknowledges the need for companies capable of partnering with foreign investment on balanced terms.
The objective must therefore not only be to attract
By 2035, Senegalese economic diplomacy could be evaluated on much more precise indicators:
- how many productive investments?
- how many joint ventures?
- how many jobs?
- what share of local content?
- how many Senegalese companies export to the Maghreb?
- how many Maghreb companies produce in Senegal?
- what added value remains in the country?
- what volumes are re-exported toward West Africa?
It is on the basis of these indicators that the economic relationship will be able to be assessed.
Senegal does not therefore necessarily have to choose between the Maghreb and West Africa. It can seek to build an economic bridge between the two spaces.
By 2035, the central question could thus be framed differently:
How to transform Senegal’s geographical position into an economic advantage, by making Dakar a point of articulation between the capital, technologies and industrial capacities of the Maghreb and the markets, resources and value chains of West Africa?
It is probably at this level that the genuine reflection on a Senegalese economic diplomacy oriented toward 2035 lies.











